NeuroMorality
Neural
Networks That Regulate Social Behavior in Conservatives and Liberals
The
human brain devotes so many resources in processing and reacting to
social stimuli that it's primary function seems to be that of a social
calculator. It has been estimated that the brain can resolve the
emotional significance of 7,000 different facial and bodily expressions.
Both emotional and cognitive neural networks have been adapted into
social regulation mechanisms such as empathy and morality, but are Conservatives
and Liberals using the morality neural networks in the same way?

"It is judgment that defeats us"--Marlon Brando's Colonel Kurtz,
weighing the applicability of morality in warfare.
In
our Fall 2005 Survey, Conservatives were more likely than Liberals to
cite morality as primary reason for their political decision
making, and Liberals were more likely to cite social concern.
These tendencies were also proportional with the strength of conservative
or liberal beliefs.
More
of the neural activity involved in emotional recognition (and empathy)
is distributed asymmetrically in the right hemisphere. This frees up
the left hemisphere to handle the demands of semantic language and fine
motor control, and generally take advantage of dopamine's superior signal-to-noise
ratio in neural communication.
But
this natural advantage of dopaminergic transmission would also be a
disadvantage in neural networks that support the perception and integration
of a wide variety of environmental stimuli, including social stimuli.
For
this, norepinephrine would prove more effective. Norepinephrine networks
not only maintain attention to the environment, but are also sensitive
to anomalies in the incoming sensory data. They will interrupt other
competing neural processes and quiet them, or possibly even redirect
them into analysis or response to the relevant environmental targets.
The
development of semantic language would cause a bit of a dilemma for
the brain---how will it handle the competing tasks of semantic language
processing and environmental attention at the same time? The brain would
take advantage of the hemispheric specialization inherited from earlier
species.
The
asymmetric specialization of semantic language into one hemisphere and
attention processes into the other would provide a measure of isolation
of these two systems, and would subsequently improve their efficiency.
This works as long as semantic language processing could be interrupted
from its activities to attend to pressing environmental issues.
But
much more was at stake than just language and environmental attention.
Related activities would also be asymmetrically distributed--one of
the most important being social calculation. The average human
has quite a sizable array of social information to keep track of.
For
example, do you know if your boss is at work today? Do you know if your
boss is angry at you? You don't have to try to remember these things,
as your brain naturally focuses on authority figures in your respective
social groups.
Do
you owe someone money? Does someone owe you money? Did someone not kick
in their fair share at your last lunch together? Is someone not pulling
their weight at work? Did you try to resolve if the new person at work
is at your level, higher, or lower?
Tracking
and responding to these types of inequalities in your daily social relationships
is instinctual--so much so that even the Lord's Prayer addresses
it: "forgive us for our trespasses as we forgive those that
trespass against us". This inequality monitoring occurs in
many primates, and has possibly contributed to the neural rendering
of arithmetic reasoning in humans.
However,
inequality monitoring is just one part of the overall social calculus
supported by the brain. Living in social groups requires limitations
to a number of undesirable behaviors, including sexual misconduct and
violence, and the brain would adapt a number of neural structures to
address these issues.
fMRI
(Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) of moral dilemmas would show
significant coordination among neural networks in resolving moral paradoxes.
One of the pioneers in the field of neuromorality, Joshua
Greene, asked people how they would respond if they were faced with
the decision to flip a switch that would eventually lead to one person's
death in order to save five other people (the famous trolley
dilemma).
Most people would say yes to this situation. It seems
that most people would employ the utilitarian, or greatest
social benefit philosophy in the more impersonal judgment
of indirectly killing someone to save others. However, when they were
asked to physically kill the person themselves, instead of just flipping
a switch, most would say no.
More
interesting were the variations in neural activity exposed during fMRI.
In the case of physically killing someone, fMRI would indicate higher
activity in neural networks normally involved with emotional processing.
This would lay to rest the traditional moral psychological theories
which maintained that morality was the result of "reasoning"
or "higher cognition". Morality was definitely regulated by
more primitive neural networks. But the brain is famous for its rather
sloppy mousetrap-like neural organization, and the so
called "higher cognitive" networks would wrestle a measure
of control from the more primitive emotional networks.
Greene would later up the ante in a subsequent study. The
question he then posed was based on whether they would physically smother
their crying baby to save the lives of many people if enemy soldiers
were approaching, and the baby would give away their position, subsequently
killing everyone.
The dials would jump on this one, and Greene found that the relative
elevation in the activation of emotional networks was more likely for
those responding no, whereas the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) and the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were more
highly activated for those saying yes. While the reason
for the elevation in activity of the ACC is subject to multiple interpretations,
(one of which involves it being a part of a network that turns on the
DLPFC), the DLPFC evidence is more viable, as it has been previously
implicated in social decision making.

The Anterior Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex-one of the brain regions
instrumental in attitudes about abortion?
Greene's moral dilemmas were becoming closer and closer to the question
of abortion. We speculate that the anterior dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex may also be a key area in resolving attitudes towards abortion,
although this remains to be seen.
The
general implication of Greene's (and others) work is that moralistic
attitudes are moderated by a combination of various neural structures
that have been added to the brain's arsenal at different evolutionary
times. The amygdala and posterior cingulate, part of the brain's emotional
network, are older structures, and adapted into moral judgments that
regulate direct interaction with other conspecifics.
The
DLPFC is a new player in the neural circus, and adapted into social
outcome analysis, which integrates a variety of motivational information,
(which includes emotional morality events), retrieves and integrates
relevant memories, projects social and personal outcomes, and subsequently
moderates behavior.
The
fMRI evidence from Greene's research would show a left hemispheric bias
in neural structures engaged in what Greene would call "easy personal"
or deontologic moral resolution, and an increase in right hemispheric
activity when the moral resolution became more "difficult".
In
contrast, when deontologic or personal moral principles were
overridden in favor of the utilitarian or greater social good
principles, such as killing one to save many, the right hemispheric
structures predominate in the decision. But Greene's sample consisted
of Princeton undergraduate students--not very representative of the
human population.
Chap
would provide cognitive evidence that age is a significant factor in
morality attitudes, as older people make more definitive moral judgments
than young people. The left hemisphere's propensity for unambiguous
cognition is probably driving this phenomenon, as there is significant
evidence that the right hemisphere ages faster than the left.
According
to Greene, there is no "specifically moral" part of the brain.
Every brain region implicated with morality has also been implicated
in non-moral functions. There are good reasons for this. The complexity
of social regulation mechanisms and environmental variations does not
fit well with a single neural and moral control system, but rather a
distributed system that handles a wide variety of survival scenarios.
The
Conservative's preference for morality in political decision making
certainly implies the greater influence of the left hemispheric neural
networks that support deontologic moral decision making. In our
cognitive laterality survey earlier this year, we noted that Conservatives
were shifted towards the left hemisphere in our scoring system, and
Liberals shifted towards the right. These
personal or deontologic moral forms are a superset of
conventional Western religious moral forms, such as those found in the
Ten Commandments.
Conversely,
Liberals are more inclined towards right hemispheric neural structures
in moral decision making, which are more likely to reverse personal
or deontologic morality responses, and apply utilitarian,
or greatest social good analysis in their moral decisions.
Brack
and Zhang,
December 2005
Email: Brack@neuropolitics.org
  Zhang@neuropolitics.org