Conservatives, Liberals, and Behavioral Inhibition
A
Tale of Two Moralities
On
average, humans are less moral than they pretend to be. There is a good
reason for this--the evolutionary value of feigned morality is quite
high. Research into the evolution of morality has made one thing very
clear--morality is not a reliable attribute for predicting human behavior.
Some
estimates place our "real" morality level as low as 50% of
our "pretended" morality level. That is, on average, we adhere
to about 50% of our moral pretense when we believe it will go undetected
by others. Even better, we frequently avoid the conscious detection
of our own personal moral violations (a.k.a. hypocrisy).
However, feigned morality will have no value without the presence of
genuine morality. Like all other psychological attributes that impact
behavior within social groups, evolution tends to favor new adaptive
strategies. Morality varies over time, both individually and populationally,
and people maintain different moralistic approaches across the different
social groups they belong to.
Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is having difficulty locating a single
neural system that handles morality, quite probably because natural
selection has not been kind to singular and mechanical moralistic approaches.
Rather, it has provided primates with a very contextual and variable
approach to morality, which incorporates elements from many neural networks,
such as those that support empathy and attitudinal reciprocity, which
are themselves descendents of the grandparents of all behavioral regulation
systems--reward seeking and harm avoidance.

Survey respondents believing the world is embraced in a struggle
between Good and Evil. (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal,
M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)
It
seems that deliberate reward seeking and harm avoidance behaviors
made their first appearance in single-celled organisms about 3 billion
years ago. But
3 billion years later, humans have acquired a very sophisticated collection
of behaviors that are a far cry from the simplistic reward seeking
and harm avoidance of these protozoans. But the more things change,
the more things stay the same.
Reward
seeking and harm avoidance pretty much encapsulate the entirety
of behavioral traits in all animals, although the reward seeking
and harm avoidance bias of these traits become harder to detect
as the brains get bigger. The evolution of human cognition, and primate
cognition in general, has been principally driven by reward seeking
and harm avoidance in social groups.
The
human brain is bustling with reward seeking and harm avoidance
activity, so much so that it precipitated the development of arithmetic
reasoning. Arithmetic reasoning would arise from the growing complexity
of primate risk and reward probability systems, which evaluated the
neural renderings of quantities of categorized rewards and risks.
This
neural rendering of arithmetic quantities is accomplished by the dopaminergic
system. As we have noted previously, the dopaminergic system is more
active in the behavioral characteristics of Conservatives than it is
with Liberals, and we have previously reported a probable advantage
for Conservatives in the processing of simple arithmetic operations.
(We have also noted a stronger tendency for Conservatives to use
verbal categorizations more than do Liberals).
In
the brain's categorization of small quantities, (such as 1, 2, and 3)--each
has a distinct and recurrent firing pattern of dopaminergic neurons.
Dopaminergic neurons support regularity in neurotransmission, which
is why they are prevalent in arithmetic and semantic language neural
networks.
But
prior to the evolution of the neural rendering of small quantities,
the developing brain was putting stimuli into more discrete categories
of risk and reward, and setting something analogous to a quantifiable
reward or harm value to each. These reward values
are further modulated by homeostatic monitoring processes.
For example, the reward value of chocolate is higher than the
reward value of cauliflower, and is modulated by a greater activation
of the dopaminergic neuronal groups that are reserved for expressing
the reward values for food items.
However,
eat too much chocolate at one time and cauliflower may become more appealing.
The brain can quickly reverse the reward value by the integration
of both homeostatic and environmental influences. One of the key (but
not the only) regions in the brain that manages reward valuations and
their reversal is also one of the most politically hot regions of the
brain--the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC).
The
orbitofrontal cortex incorporates both reward and harm value information,
along with quantity and probability assessments, and organizes a behaviorally
relevant decision. Its functions are similar to the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC), except that the OFC seems to handle riskier and more
survivally relevant decision making. People with OFC damage have trouble
recognizing reward and risk probabilities, and are frequently the victims
of excessive gambling.
But
what makes the OFC so politically relevant is its propensity to integrate
the social ramifications of personal reward seeking behavior.
Empathetic neural networks are typically more organized in the right
hemisphere, and this places more of the burden of the integration of
social empathy and reward seeking on the right OFC.
And
this is what lesion studies of the left and right OFCs have detected.
Lesions to the right OFC result in a greater probability of socially
unacceptable reward seeking, and lesions to the left OFC result
in the greater inhibition of socially unacceptable reward seeking,
and reward seeking in general.
As
we have proposed before, the Liberals are more likely to adapt neural
networks in the right hemisphere to counteract socially unacceptable
reward seeking, and the right orbitofrontal cortex is a principal
facilitator of this inhibition.
The
human brain's evolution of inhibition mechanisms against anti-social
reward seeking would take multiple approaches, and also serve
the function of supporting hemisphericity in cognition. This was especially
important as humans were shifting their cognition towards the left hemisphere,
which was handling most of the burdens of semantic language and arithmetic,
and therefore exerting a growing influence on behavior.
The problem with the left hemisphere is that it is more organized around
reward seeking than the right, which is more organized around
harm avoidance.
So
how did the left hemisphere control its strong tendency for reward
seeking?
The Left Hemisphere Turns Against Itself
The
left hemisphere is very active in both the categorization and assignment
of reward values to stimuli. It is this process that would be adapted
not only into language and arithmetic, but also into a behavioral inhibition
system.
Language
and arithmetic networks are heavily integrated with the left hemisphere's
categorization and valuation systems for rewards and risks. Much of
human conversation, even idle conversation, serves both the direct and
indirect functions of reward seeking and harm avoidance.
The
sophisticated human reward system would also gain a measure of regulation
by its own propensity to modulate the values of rewards and risks based
on social controls. Social controls on reward seeking behavior
are exerted in infancy, where reward seeking behaviors are regulated
mainly by parental and sibling reinforcement.
The
infant's expanding categorization and valuation of rewards seems to
be mediated primarily by the interaction of the olfactory (smell) and
gustatory (taste) systems with the temporal cortex, which coincidentally
just happens to be the primary religious region in adults. The rapidly
growing infant temporal cortex is heavily utilizing the chemical sensing
systems of smell and taste to establish reward valuations to stimuli
classes.
This
also coincides with the integration of language into the expanding reward
categorization system. During this period, parental usage of words such
as good and bad and yes and no are frequent,
and serve to influence the infant's reward valuations. The religious
concepts of Good and Evil and Heaven and Hell
are built from this human reward categorization and valuation system,
which is distributed mainly in the left hemisphere.
It
is this left temporal-centric system that strongly influences the moral
behavior of the Very Religious. It is certainly not surprising that
religions that are temporal-centric, such as Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism, incorporate an enhanced set of reward and harm values, (Heaven
and/or Hell), with an enhanced reliance on public belief
reinforcement, (public prayer and worship), and a strong promotion of
submissive behaviors towards a good and powerful deity.
Discussion
We have
previously proposed that Conservatives and Liberals are not symmetric
in their reward-seeking behaviors (see our discussion on the
Ghost World of Conservatives and Liberals in our February
2006 edition).
The
Conservative's cognitive style and morality are more organized around
the left-hemisphere's reward categorization system, which gives them
a rather interesting combination of behaviors. Their moral systems are
more influenced by social cues than are the Liberals, who rely more
on the right hemisphere's innate empathetic and harm-avoidant nature
to interfere with their own reward seeking systems. (We must note
that we have some indirect cognitive evidence of a greater empathetic
response towards infants by the Conservatives, especially the religious
Conservatives).
This
social modulation of the reward categorization system provides an interesting
adaptive advantage for this form of morality that is based heavily on
social cues. This type of morality can be adjusted more quickly than
empathetic morality.
As we have proposed before, the Conservatives, and especially the religious
Conservatives, tend to align their beliefs more within their social
groups. This is due to their reward seeking system's heavy integration
of social cues to moderate the values and risks of reward seeking.
A socially-controlled morality allows for a closer integration of group
behaviors, along with moral variation to changes in those social cues.
Religiosity
has an interesting combination of strong reward seeking behaviors mixed
together with strong reward inhibition mechanisms. It seems that religiosity
may be a highly active state of reward seeking. This hyperactive
state has evolved into prosocial non-worldly reward seeking,
where the rewards are obtained in the afterlife.
This is a remarkable evolution of primate reward seeking behavior, and
it seems to reduce the competitiveness and conflict of worldly reward
seeking within social groups, along with structuring and coordinating
group behavior. Religiosity has done all this while promoting reproduction,
which is the reason why it has maintained its strong foothold on the
cognitive landscape of humanity.
But
the Non-Religious cling tightly to their proportion of the population,
despite their lower reproductive rates. So how did humans get into this
unusual state of multiple approaches to morality, all integrated within
the same community? Has evolution secretly retained multiple approaches
to morality because it provides some adaptive advantage?
One
thing is becoming very clear from our current survey--the Religious
and Non-Religious do not have very good opinions about each other's
morals (or each other). While economics is the principal reason for
the Religious and Non-Religious to inhabit the same communities, it
has created an interesting dynamic of moral evolution.
This
dynamic of two morality systems is seen in the case of the anti-slavery
movement in the United States in the early 1800's. The abolitionists
at this time consisted of a few liberal reformers, along with the support
of a few religious groups, such as the Quakers. However, support from
religious groups was very minimal at the beginning of the movement.
One
of the successful abolitionist strategies was to incorporate religious
groups by appealing primarily to religious leaders to oppose slavery.
Once support from the religious leadership was obtained, the congregational
responses were strong, and provided the electoral clout that was punctuated
by Lincoln's election in 1860.
But
the religious groups were certainly not consistent in their anti-slavery
morality, which is indicative of how important social cues are to the
moral systems of the Religious. Religious groups such as the southern
Methodists and Baptists broke away from their abolitionist northern
wings. A practicing Christian's opinion on slavery was dictated primarily
by the congregation's opinion.
This
interaction between left-brained socially-cued religious morality and
right-brained liberalistic empathy would be seen a number of times in
US social reform movements, something analogous to an atomic chain reaction
of behavior, starting slowly with liberalistic empathy and expanding
rapidly via religious socially-cued morality.
When
liberalistic empathy is combined with socially-cued religious morality,
rapid social change is eminent, as happened during the U.S. Civil War.
But is this moral
chain reaction between empathetic Liberals and socially-cued religious
Conservatives still functional in the United States? Or has their growing
segregation and animosity caused it to be no longer operational?
People
consciously and subconsciously look for behavioral cues that have moralistic
overtones, and are more likely to maintain associations with others
with similar moralistic approaches. We will discuss this in our next
edition, when we begin to break down the results of our Ethnic and
Religious Attitudes Survey, and see how the Religious and Non-Religious
are handling this not-so-secret dislike for each other's moral systems.