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           The Ghost World of Liberals and Conservatives


October 2008

Apocalypse Now

 

Genetic Warfare and the 2008 Presidential Election

 

Instead of a messy war, these two adversaries now target the reproduction of each other's genes

 

The American political landscape is one of the most genetically and geographically diverse in the world, and not surprisingly, one of the most contentious. Presidential elections evoke many of the same phenomena associated with actual warfare: political xenophobia (the demonizing and elevated sense of threat from members of the other party); stronger feelings of affiliation and cooperation within the respective Democratic and Republican camps; an elevation in stress levels that escalate until election day; psychological warfare identical to that waged in actual warfare; depression and lower testosterone levels for the members of the losing party; and most importantly, from a Darwinian perspective, variations in gene frequencies depending on who wins.

 

In a very real sense, modern presidential elections are the distant cousins of the Civil War, with America still politically divided down the Mason-Dixon line. This line is near 40° north latitude, which is significant for Caucasians, as they evolved in latitudes just above 40°. During this evolution, Caucasian skin rapidly reduced melanin levels to counter the problems associated with molecular synthesis (e.g., Vitamin D3) in the epidermis due to low sunlight intensity. I have previously proposed a theory that Caucasian political-religious behavior is asymmetric based on latitude, driven by the elevation in the synthesis of sex hormones in regions with greater sunlight intensity, and their resulting impact on the dopamine system.

 

By all rights, the northern side of the Mason-Dixon line should be more conservative, given the very religious nature of the early migrations from Europe. Instead, religious-conservative Caucasians now dominate the south. It is also interesting that countries which have recently fissioned along a northern-southern boundary (e.g. Korea, Vietnam)--the northern sector is shifted more politically leftward than the southern sector.

 

The land of the free, and the home of the DRD4-7

 

Besides latitude, we have proffered several reasons for the curious nature of the American political geography, one of which involves the political tendencies of migrating populations. Migrating populations have distinctive genetic tendencies, most notably with the highly polymorphic dopamine receptor gene, DRD4. DRD4 is one of the most polymorphic genes in the human genome, and interestingly, one of the most behaviorally variant. The dopamine system contains a number of different receptor types, and the D4 receptor is most likely to line the neural pathways associated with the politically and religiously-hot reward system.

 

Chen et al. (1999) noted a tendency for migrant populations to have higher frequencies of the 7-repeat allele of DRD4 (the 4-repeat allele is the most common). The 7-repeat allele (DRD4-7) seems to have an inhibiting impact on the experience of reward, inducing greater risk-taking to simulate the same chemical impact as the more efficient 4-repeat version. Migratory populations are generally risk-takers, and this may be facilitated by higher levels of the 7-repeat. Chen describes the long-allele DRD4 variations associated with the prehistoric Asian-to-Americas migration:

 

For the first route of migration (from northeastern Asia to Americas), South Americans have the largest proportion of long alleles (69%), followed by the one Central American group (42%), whereas North Americans have the lowest proportion of long alleles (32%). Moreover, all American groups have more long alleles than northern and eastern Asians (i.e, Yakut, Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese averaged 5% long alleles).

 

Chen's results were replicated in other non-Americas migrations, ruling out a "founders" effect explanation for this phenomenon (Chen promotes a natural selection hypothesis, implicating that new territories select for high frequencies of long DRD4 alleles, possibly related to higher reproductive output). While comparisons of modern-day Asian migrations to America do not point to a discernable difference in long allele frequencies, modern-day Asian migration is not nearly as risky as pre-2oth century migration, tends to be urban to urban, and tends towards higher educational levels. While interesting, it pales in comparison to the data associated with Asian and Caucasian DRD4 frequencies.

 

Table 1: DRD4 long allele comparisons of immigrants compared to home countries (from Chen, 1999)

 

The difference between the frequencies of long alleles of DRD4 among Asians and Caucasians is striking, and one that may be reflected in the cognitive variations between these two races (see Nisbett's Geography of Thought, 2003). The Caucasians have been the most territorially expansive of the races, and their high frequencies of the DRD4 long-alleles may be contributing to this phenomenon.

 

Just as suspicious is the Caucasian-American elevation in long allele frequencies relative to Europeans. The Caucasian-Americans, based on these handful of studies, have higher long allele frequencies than do the Caucasian-Europeans (although these studies are not exactly comparable due to the lack of controls for the specific European origin of the Caucasian-American samples).

 

But even given the elevation of the frequency of long alleles of DRD4 in the Caucasian-Americans, so what? The behavioral significance of DRD4 is cloudy, like all other single-gene studies of behavior. Complex social behavior involves a diverse array of environmental and genetic influences, and the more complex the behavior, the more diverse the array. Long alleles of DRD4 have been implicated, although equivocally, in novelty-seeking, exploration, drug-dependence, reward-seeking, extraversion, hyperactivity, spiritual transcendence, OCD, ADHD, and schizophrenia (in Caucasians).

 

In the case of the relationship between DRD4 and spiritual transcendence (Comings, 2000), which is particularly relevant to religiosity, the results are just as cloudy. Hamer (2004) found no correlation between DRD4 and spirituality, but rather, implicated another gene, VMAT2. However, VMAT2 still connects religiosity to the dopamine system, as it functions as a transporter for the monoamine neurotransmitter molecules: dopamine, serotonin, and norepinephrine.

 

The r-strategists: what is the relationship between big families, teenage pregnancy, oil, and Alaska?

 

You don't have to look very far to find examples of the relationship between dopamine, reproduction, and migration to new territories. They will find you. Eisenberg et al. (2007) noted a correlation between long alleles of DRD4 and earlier age of initiation of first sexual activity and desire for children. This, in addition to the correlation with migratory behavior, provides for increased reproductive output, a corresponding tendency to populate new territories, and higher rates of resource utilization and habitat depletion--an implication that DRD4-7 may indeed contribute to the phenomenon of r-strategy (in population biology).

 

The fact that Sarah Palin lives in Alaska, is religious, has five children, is pro-oil, pro-life, and has a pregnant teenage daughter, are all related to the Darwinian phenomenon of reproductive advantage, and indeed may be partially related to DRD4-7. However, we must again note, single-gene theories are poor predictors of complex human behaviors.

 

In the sunlight theory of asymmetric Caucasian political behavior, the conservative tendencies of the Alaskan population were the major violation. However, the sunlight theory operates via the dopamine system, and the elevated frequencies of DRD4-7 in migratory populations indeed may help explain this anomaly. Alaska has the lowest population density of the 50 states, the highest proportion of males, and a high percentage of Caucasian immigrants, all of which combine to conservatize populations.

 

DRD4-7: Liberal, Conservative, or Both?

 

Table 1 indicates a radical difference between Asians and Caucasians: what happened to DRD4-7 in the Asians? DRD4-7 was higher in the migratory populations that made their way across the Bering Strait and down into the Americas. The further the migration, the higher the frequency of DRD4-7. Despite the apparent reproductive advantages of DRD4-7 for migratory populations, back in Asia, the sedentary and low-space model of Asian reproduction has virtually eliminated it from their gene pool. What happened?

 

Chen's aforementioned proposal for the natural selection of DRD4-7 is certainly not without its detractors, but seems to make sense in light of its dearth in the Asian mainland population. Perhaps the asymmetries of the frequencies of DRD4-7 are best explained by population density and sedentarianism. DRD4-7 may be deselected as populations grow more dense and more stationary, either through self-selection (migration) or the diminished reproductive value DRD4-7 in high-density urban populations. The question is, what does the Asian experience mean for the American Caucasians?

 

While I have made much of the fact that the preponderance of neurological evidence implicates that the dopamine system is more likely to promote those attitudes and behaviors typically associated with religious-conservatism, the DRD4-7 allele has actually been indirectly linked to liberalism by Fowler et al. (see Friendships Moderate an Association Between a Dopamine Gene Variant and Political Ideology). Fowler's curious proposal of a gene-environment interaction of teenage friendship, DRD4-7, and liberalism was derived from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, which tracks the behavior of 7th to 12th graders and their outcomes as young adults.

 

While Fowler maintains that DRD4-7 is not correlated with political affiliation by itself, its combination with environmental triggers (i.e., a larger number of non-relative friendships during teenage years), would induce a shift towards liberalism in young adults. Fowler proposed that the relationship between novelty-seeking and DRD4-7 is the link to liberalism, but as Fowler noted, only about half of the studies of novelty-seeking and long DRD4 alleles have shown a connection.

 

We have previously noted that liberals are indeed novelty seekers when it comes to such things as musical preferences, and that conservatives are more likely to seek out physical rewards associated with supporting their higher reproductive rates. While both of these attributes have been linked to the various genes associated with the dopamine system, they have also been linked to genes associated with the serotonergic system. Further, the interaction of dopamine and serotonin gene variants, such as the DAT1 (dopamine transporter 1) and 5-HTTLPR (serotonin transporter-linked promoter region), are associated with harm avoidance and reward dependence (Kim, 2006), which probably have political-religious overtones.

 

From the National Longitudinal Study, Fowler had only 5 genes to work with. Nor did he discuss (and possibly find) any other correlation to environmental triggers other than "teenage friendship". A genetic connection to friendship has been found in genes associated with the serotonin system, implicating the L allele of 5-HTTLPR with a lower affinity of liking parties and friends (Pascual, 2007). In Fowler's findings, it is certainly possible that serotonergic genes are hidden contributors to his results.

 

The association between DRD4-7 and political-religious affiliation seems to be dependent on its interaction with other genes and environmental influences, which is why behavioral studies are equivocal. It may be a contributing factor in enhancing both dispositions, dependent on the peculiar genetic and environmental combinations it is exposed to.

 

Its relationship to a higher desire for children, a distinct tendency of religious-conservatism, and its relationship to novelty-seeking in such areas as art and music, a distinct tendency of secular-liberalism, may indicate its possible adaptation in both tendencies under selected conditions. Further, it is interesting to note that DRD4-7 may be a catalyst in the polarization of the political-religious attitudes, that is, it tends to enhance both tendencies.

 

It may indeed be a "polarizing" gene, that is, helping to behaviorally diversify populations, and presumably working to increase the carrying capacity of habitats. A homogeneous population of liberals or conservatives will indeed produce children with a more diversified pattern of political-religious affiliation, and DRD4-7 may be one of the genes facilitating this process.

 

We must note that conservatives are more likely to seek out police, fire, rescue, and military occupations than are liberals, which are high-risk and novelty-seeking. However, we must note that occupational choices are complex, and not all conservatives seek out high-risk careers. There are indeed a high percentage of both conservatives and liberals that are risk-averse, shy, and behaviorally inhibited.

 

Genetic asymmetries in the Northern and Southern United States

 

Over the 20th century, the northeastern United States about doubled in population, while the south and southwest grew by 15 times. The explosive population growth of the southern states was fueled by higher immigration rates and elevated birth rates. This begs one of the most important political and religious questions in the new science of behavioral genetics: does the American south, with its higher proportion of immigrants, have higher frequencies of DRD4-7? To our knowledge, no such genetic studies exist. The relationship between migration and DRD4-7 certainly predicts higher frequencies in the south and southwest, but this genetic bombshell remains to be seen.

 

Conservatism and liberalism actually solve two of the greatest problems of population biology: the survival and reproduction of humans in low and high population density environments. Indeed, the political geography of the United States supports the r-K selection hypothesis of conservatism and liberalism. The trouble starts when conservatives and liberals are forced to share a common political system, and inevitably interfere with each other's reproductive strategies.

 

Just as genes influence behavior, behavior influences genes. Politics and religion are fundamentally about genetics, and as such, constantly induce selective pressure on gene frequencies. I have previously proposed that the genes associated with the functioning of the monoamine neurotransmitter systems, dopamine, serotonin, and norepinephrine, to be the primary targets of political-religious selection. This selection works through both reproductive advantage and life expectancy, and it is interesting to note that the political hot button of health care is linked to both. The divergent approaches to health care by conservatives and liberals is ultimately Darwinian, as I shall explain later.

 

The genetic war of age, religion, race, and gender

 

Explicit strategies to eliminate competing genes are relatively rare events, the most infamous case being the Nazi "final solution to the Jewish question". Humans are usually more polite when it comes to genetic competition, and rather, form into political and religious alliances to promote their own genetics and attack undesirable genes and the undesirable cultural memes that support them. And if you do this, you'd better gloss over the ugly nature of the Darwinian game you are playing, otherwise it will diminish the ability to play it.

 

Age, race, religion, and gender are the keynotes of the 2008 election, a stunning testament to the growing diversity of the American gene pool. But with genetic diversity comes genetic competition, and the hostility experienced during presidential campaigns has the distinct flavor of civil war. There is such an aura of political and religious conflict that the United States seems to be in the early phases of another fissioning, waiting for some trigger to burst the dam of central control. Indeed, the fissioning of the United States would please many of the participants in our election survey, most notably at the opposite ends of the political spectrum: the very liberals and the very conservatives.

 

Political behavior is a human variant of animal pseudofighting. Even primitive animals have evolved multiple modes of fighting that provide for less-lethal outcomes, while resolving resource or sexual competition. Ultimately, political and religious behavior, like pseudofighting, target the reproduction of genes, while lethal fighting targets the genes themselves.

 

Before we make our case that age, religion, race, and gender are different dimensions in a not-so-subtle genetic war, let's take a look at some of the results from our Election 2008 survey. The survey points to a number of diverse and interesting trends in the psychology of the American electorate: the continued polarization of conservatives and liberals; a distinct aversion to religious candidates by the secular; the liberalization of the moderates; higher general levels of stress; a mean-spirited America, that is, an increase in the levels of competitiveness and spiteful behaviors; and the rapid decline of reproduction among the lower and middle classes.

 

When it comes to voter fear, nothing beats religious politicians

 

Following neatly down the line of the hemisphericity theory of political orientation, inhibition of racist tendencies appears to be facilitated by a right hemispheric neural network, more specifically, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate (Richeson, 2003). Gender bias, like racial bias, has been associated with the activation of the amygdala (Knutson, 2007), and its inhibition, like that of racial prejudice, is related to activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Further, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is instrumental in the inhibition of the phenomenon of belief-bias, that is, the ability to maintain beliefs in the face of contrary information (Goel, 2003).

 

While the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is inhibiting gender, racial, and possibly age bias, it seems to be encouraging antireligious bias. In our Election 2008 survey, the 1,714 respondents reported a greater negative reaction to religion in politics than either race, gender, or age. Religion in politics was the greatest point of concern among everyone but the conservatives.

 

Political Affiliation	Sex	Race Bias	Age Bias	Gender Bias	Religious Bias
VL	Female	0.70	-2.22	0.87	-3.53
L	Female	0.65	-2.20	0.93	-2.69
LB	Female	0.68	-1.59	0.70	-1.78
M	Female	0.23	-1.61	0.74	-1.69
C	Female	-0.29	-0.48	-0.44	0.46
VC	Female	-0.70	0.67	-0.84	1.42
VL	Male	0.80	-1.74	0.69	-3.30
L	Male	0.72	-1.97	0.57	-2.88
LB	Male	0.30	-1.08	0.22	-2.32
M	Male	0.03	-1.37	-0.06	-1.64
C	Male	-0.28	0.09	-0.28	0.15
VC	Male	-0.49	0.15	-0.85	1.11

Table 2: Average self-ratings of the impact of race, age, gender, and religion on voting attitudes
(VL=Very Liberal,L=Liberal,LB=Libertarian,M=Moderate,C=Conservative,VC=Very Conservative)

 

We asked the survey respondents to rate their relative attitudes, on a scale of -5 to 5 (with -5 being the most negative rating, 0 being neutral, and 5 being the most positive), on the impact of Obama's race, McCain's age, Clinton's gender (the survey was taken before Sarah Palin), and Huckabee's religion on the probability of voting for each candidate. As can be seen in Table 2, the strongest reactions were to Huckabee's religion, which varied from -3.53 for the very liberal (VL) females to a high of 1.42 for the very conservative (VC) females.

 

Across all political cohorts, except for the conservatives and very conservatives, Huckabee's religious background had the highest negative rating. While the negative reaction to religion was expected from the liberals (VL and L), the libertarians (LB) and moderates (M) also ranked Huckabee's religious background more negatively than race, age, or gender. We must note that the regular conservatives (C), on average, gave Huckabee's religion a very slight positive rating, and this lukewarm rating perhaps explains his easy defeat by John McCain.

 

Surprisingly, Obama's race rated less negatively than McCain's age in our survey. However, we suspect this statistic is not fully reflective of the real political influence of racial prejudice, based on two arguments: Obama is half-Caucasian, which indeed moderates the racial prejudice against him; and further, people tend to underplay their own level of racial prejudice (Vanman et al., 1997). In all of our surveys, around 70% of people admit to some level of racial prejudice.

 

Detecting genetic and social distance

 

When JBS Haldane first remarked "I would lay down my life for two brothers or eight cousins", he was referring to what would eventually become the coefficient of relatedness, which is the percentage of genes shared by common descent. Your coefficient of relatedness with an identical twin would be 1.0. It would be 0.5 with an ordinary sibling, 0.125 with a cousin, and comes courtesy of the wonder of the most politically-relevant function of cellular reproduction: meiosis. Meiosis is evolution's answer to the problem of speeding up genetic variation in slowly reproducing organisms.

 

 

	Africa	Oceania	East Asia	Europe
Oceania	24.7
East Asia	20.6	10.0
Europe	16.6	13.5	9.7
America	22.6	14.6	8.9	9.5

Table 3: Blood group polymorphism percentage differences between continents (from Cavalli-Sforza)

 

Ironically, Haldane, a pioneer in population genetics and noted Marxist, was unknowingly outlining the fundamental problem of communistic societies. Nothing illustrates this problem better than the nuclear family, where "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need" really means something. While Marx was very curious about Mendel's and Darwin's theories, he never connected genetic distance to social behavior, nor did he realize that communism was a social structure based on low genetic and social distance. Communistic societies attempt to simulate family-like social organizations with father-like leaders that maintain power over an extended time period. As such, these social organizations are especially vulnerable during changes of leadership.

 

This brings us to the 2008 Presidential election, and its unique convergence of age, religion, race, and gender. White males no longer lay sole claim to the presidency of the United States, and for two very good reasons: the increasing value of the female ovum, and the decline in the percentage of white males. The genetic distance between McCain and Obama reflects the general trend towards growing genetic distance in the US population, and the political-religious conflict associated with it.

 

But what is genetic distance? And how do we detect and adjust our social behavior around it? Some estimates place the number of DNA base-pair variations from human to human at about 3 million. While seemingly a large number, it represents only about 0.1% of the human genome. Humans are only able to keep track of a very small portion of genetic variation, such as that associated with odor and physical features.

 

On average, racial prejudice and genetic distance are correlated variables. That is, the greater the genetic distance between two populations, the greater the racial prejudice between them. Our self-assessment surveys reveal this asymmetry, as seen in Table 3. American Caucasians are more prejudiced against African-Americans than any other racial group. They are least prejudiced against Asians, even though they rate Asians as more competitive than any other race. This pattern is also reciprocal. We have discussed the neural correlates of racial prejudice in The Blackening of Barack Obama.

 

Talking 'bout my generation

 

Racial prejudice is the most obvious trait associated with attacking genetic distance, but in our survey, prejudice against age rated higher. The evidence of an innate tendency for ageism (Castelli, 2005) raises the question: what Darwinian function is it supporting? That function is reproduction, and age bias works on two distinct evolutionary tracks. The first track involves reproductive effectiveness, which decreases or completely stops with age.

 

Thus, age bias reflects the diminishing reproductive value of the aged, and works to improve fertility for those in their prime reproductive years. The second Darwinian track of age bias involves the growing burden of the elderly on reproduction, after they are no longer able to provide a reproductive support function as grandparents.

 

Ageism is also facilitated by the fact that genetic distance increases between generations. In a closed population, given the distinct tendency for a higher percentage of males not to reproduce, the next generation is genetically shifted towards the males that did reproduce. Thus, gene frequencies are different in the parent population than in the daughter population.

 

In the real world case of open populations with migration, this tendency is exacerbated, due to the fact that immigrants tend to be younger. Thus, the generational war is reflective of the genetic distance between the "older" and "younger" generations.

 

Is the battle of the sexes a genetic one?

 

Genetic warfare between males and females is hard to imagine, given the very high percentage of genes shared by these two genders. However, it is the single largest current contributor to the natural selection of the human species, and works by reducing the percentage of males that reproduce.

 

Eve's Rib? The Y chromosome (lower right) only codes for 23 proteins

 

Across most sexually reproducing species, the gender that produces the larger gamete is put in charge of sexual selection, as this larger gamete requires a greater investment of time and resources. While males have neutralized the female advantage in sexual selection by contributing substantially to reproduction, an average male's genes are less likely to be reproduced than an average female's. The percent of males having no offspring is higher than the percent of females, and this trend appears to be accelerating.

 

What genes are the females attacking? In addition to female sexual selection, there is a self-selection process, primarily from liberal males and females, that are deciding against reproduction due to overcrowding and environmental problems. However, females in general seem to be eliminating the genes held by low-income males, that is, males that are less able to support reproduction. While gender bias among males works to increase reproductive output via increased male dominance, gender bias among females works to reduce it, and at the same time reducing the percentage of males that reproduce.

 

One interesting side note, about 95% of the Y chromosome is inhibited from recombining with the X chromosome. Y contains about 80 genes, while the X chromosome contains about 1000. Since Y is inherited down the male line of descent, it is not only the major pathway of genetic divergence between males and females, its genes seem to be a major target of female sexual selection.

 

The genetic implications of the very religious

 

There is a distinct tendency for small migrating religious groups to genetically diverge from their parent populations, due primarily to the founders effect, but also to geographic and cultural isolation. Unless isolated religious groups maintain aggressive conversion programs, they progressively diverge from their parent populations over time. McLellan et al. (1984) noted this tendency from the genetic study of Mormon, Hutterite, Amish, and Mennonite religious groups, and their parent populations in Europe.

 

From the plot below, only the Mormon population (in Utah) and the Mennonites have maintained relative genetic parity with their parent European populations. To neutralize genetic drift, the Mormons had a large founder population, and maintain an aggressive recruitment program. The Mennonites, besides having a large founder population, were the most secular, neutralizing genetric drift associated with cultural isolation, which is a tendency of migrating religious populations.

 

The high rate of genetic drift among the Amish and Hutterites was due to a relatively small founder population, along with poor recruitment programs. The Amish and Hutterites have also drifted dramatically from their founder populations, an indication of rapid selective forces shaping their population gene pool.

 

Genetic distance (based on four red cell antigen loci) for American religious groups and European populations of origin (adapted from McLellan, 1984)

 

There indeed seems to be a tendency for level of religiosity to correlate with the level of genetic divergence. This is facilitated by a tendency for the very religious to engage in highly affiliative behaviors within the religious sect, inbreeding (within the religious sect), higher reproductive rates, xenophobia, and geographic isolation.

 

The tendency of the very religious to favor such things as religious education and home schooling, along with their high reproductive rates, is fundamentally a strategy of more rapid genetic propagation across a narrower range of genes. Promoting this model of DNA replication translates directly into a number of political-religious attitudes, as we shall now review.

 

Translating political-religious attitudes into gene frequencies

 

Killing ain't what it used to be. The male version of reproductive competition has often been quite violent, as males face a greater risk of not reproducing than females. Napoleon Chagnon's (1989) chilling account of Yanomamo murder and male reproductive effectiveness sparked one of the great controversies in anthropological history, as he found that Yanomamo males killing other males had three times as many children as those that did not.

 

But the low-technology model of the Yanomamo economy is more likely to retain the reproductive value of male violence. Some estimates place the rate of violent death among Yanomamo males at around 25%. However, for modern economies, this rate plunges to well under 1%, an indication that male violence is not the only game in town when it comes to reproductive effectiveness.

 

The modern technological model of human reproduction has been hard on intragroup male violence, primarily due to the high educational levels, specialization, and the cooperation required to maintain it. Ingroup male violence has thus diminished in its reproductive effectiveness, not to mention the highly coordinated counter measures employed by social groups to reduce it.

 

Thus, it has been predominately replaced by a variety of more polite mechanisms that simultaneously engage in genetic warfare, while maintaining the highly specialized and integrated technological culture that supports large populations. Political and religious behavior are ultimately Darwinian adaptations. And like any adaptation, a changing environment creates selective pressure on its constituent genes and memes.

 

So how do political-religious groups genetically compete? What are they doing to promote their own genes, while politely attacking competing genes? One only need turn on the TV during an election year to see the answers to this question. All of the hot-button political issues translate directly into a fundamental genetic conflict, and impact population gene pools in a manner not too different than violent warfare.

 

Genetic implications of Taxes and Health Care

 

Tax rates are a key plank of both Obama and McCain's platforms, and also translate directly into gene frequencies. The Obama and McCain tax proposals will have different genetic impacts, with Obama focusing his wrath on incomes over $2.9 million, while giving most of his tax relief, on a percentage basis, to lower income families. Conversely, McCain, while making across the board tax cuts, gives a greater percentage tax relief to upper income families.

 

When it comes to reproduction, males are more impacted by income. High-income males produce more children, have a longer reproductive period, and reproduce with more females. The tax code translates directly into reproductive success, and interestingly, males consider taxes to be a more important issue than females. The more reproductive the male, the more important tax policies were. The reproductive conservative males were more likely to show concern for tax policies, while the liberals rated it very low.

 

Obama's tax proposals attack the very rich and their substantial advantage in reproduction, while McCain's proposals provide them with an even greater advantage. Since income levels are correlated with race, the Obama and McCain tax plans have distinctive genetic outcomes.

 

But are the genes of the wealthy different? If so, how far have they diverged? The divergence of the elite from mainstream genetics is certainly suspected by many, most notably, the elite. However, actual evidence of divergence is sparse, and comes mainly from genetic studies of the highly organized caste system of India.

 

Bamshad et al. (2001) found an interesting confluence of male and female genetics in India, which seems to highlight the mobility of female genetics across social class. In their study of mitochrondrial DNA, which is inherited from the mother, Bamshad found that the frequency of Western Eurasian haplotypes was proportional to caste rank. The higher the caste rank, the greater the percentage of Western Eurasian haplotypes. However, mitochrondial DNA (mtDNA) was still more closely associated with Asian mtDNA across all castes.

 

However, in their study of the Y chromosome, inherited paternally, the results indicate that each caste is more closely associated to Europeans than Asians. Further, the European influence is proportionate to caste rank. The results from Bamshad do indeed indicate a substantial genetic divergence with caste rank, and further, greater female mobility across caste (the beautiful-female effect).

 

But what does this mean for the genetics of social classes in the United States? To our knowledge, no United States genetic studies by social class exist, and can only be inferred by combining the results of related studies. In India, with the immigrations from Europe, the Near East, Turkey, and southern Russian, the Asian and Caucasian genetic worlds collided, favoring Caucasian genetics in the upper classes. This same pattern appears to have happened in America, with Caucasian and Asian genetics (via the earlier Asian migrations) again colliding, with an analogous result, that is, the upper classes favoring European genes.

 

However, the United States economy is dramatically different, and technological change presents an ongoing problem for the stability of social classes. Further, family fortunes are typically dissipated after three generations, due to both technological change and the higher net reproductive rates that usually occur after a surge in family wealth. Therefore, the genetic divergence of the upper classes is moderated to a substantial degree by economic trends.

 

Health care is another hot-button issue, and one that certainly has substantial genetic implications, as it relates to both infant and child mortality, reproductive effectiveness, and life expectancy. The statistics are interesting for health insurance, and indeed, asymmetric by racial group. In 2007, the percentage of Caucasians in the United States covered by health insurance was greater than that of Blacks (90% to 80%), according to the US Census Bureau. Further, the percentage of insured Asians was 83%, while Hispanics had the lowest rate, at 68%.

 

This is certainly an indication that Caucasians have achieved an advantage in health insurance, but only maintain advantages in infant mortality and life expectancy relative to Blacks. Asians and Hispanics are comparable or slightly better than Caucasians on both counts, even though their health insurance coverage rates are lower. Healthwise, it appears that Caucasians may be at a genetic (and perhaps cultural) disadvantage relative to the Asian gene pool. However, income level is correlated with lowering child mortality and increasing life expectancy, so the Caucasian upper classes do indeed enjoy an advantage relative to the lower classes.

 

Based on our survey, health care is a significant issue for all political cohorts, except for the conservatives. The conservatives distribute their altruism across a lower genetic bandwidth than any of the other political cohorts, and this is reflected in their relative indifference to increasing the percentages of the insured. Indeed, Obama's health care proposals increase this rate, while McCain's proposals are neutral. The liberals indeed rate the importance of health care higher than any other political cohort, following their wider genetic bandwidth of altruism. Indeed, this attitude promotes Asian, Hispanic, Black, and non-upper class Caucasian genetics in the gene pool.

 

Genetic implications of Abortion, Gay marriage, and Immigration

 

The so called "values" issues, so much the focus of the religious-conservatives, are fundamentally issues of reproductive output. Abortion and traditional male-female marriage rated higher among the conservatives than any other political cohort, which should be no surprise, given that the religious-conservatives both desire and have the most children.

 

The religious-conservative attitude against gay marriage is curious, as it would not seem to have any direct impact on their reproductive rates. However, over the long run, it could. From a Darwinian perspective, it is a long-range reproductive strategy, and promotes their genes into the next generations, countering the inconsistent heterosexuality of the human genome. Thus, the religious-conservatives, in their opposition to gay marriage, are attempting to improve the reproductive effectiveness of their own offspring.

 

To the conservatives, the issue of immigration was the third most important, behind the economy and terrorism. Immigration dilutes the gene pool, and the hypothesis that conservatives distribute their altruistic behavior over a smaller genetic bandwidth is certainly looking very reasonable. Conversely, liberals were the least concerned about immigration, again, consistent with the theory that liberals distribute altruism over the widest genetic distance.

 

Iraq and terrorism are interesting, in that they draw two equal and opposite reactions by conservatives and liberals. Iraq is still a very big issue with the liberals, while among conservatives, it is much less significant. However, terrorism produced the exact opposite reaction in both cohorts. After the economy, conservatives rated terrorism second, while with liberals, terrorism was rated among the least important issues.

 

Over the duration of the Iraqi war, the conservatives, relative to the other political cohorts, have been remarkably supportive. The strong tendency of conservatives to organize for intergroup conflict has no peer among the other political cohorts, while liberals are the poorest (although they do organize quite effectively against the conservatives).

 

Warfare and Reproduction: the strange case of Fertility, Iraq, and Terrorism

 

Perhaps nothing illustrates the difference between conservatives and liberals better than warfare. Conservatives organize for intergroup conflict like no other political cohort, which is why they overwhelm the ranks of the military. But we have been puzzled by the ability of conservatives to sustain conflict for so long. Warfare generally has a negative impact on reproduction (Turchin, 2003), and on those grounds, one might think the fertile conservatives would be the most opposed to it.

 

100 years in Iraq: no problem for the conservatives

 

Far from it. In our first calculations in 2006, we estimated that it would take 35 years before the level of conservative support for the Iraqi war to drop below 50%. At the time, we thought this number was a statistical aberration, since it was substantially higher than any of the other political cohorts. As it turns out, this number is low, at least in the case of a successful occupation of a foreign territory. Since the surge, there has been a revival of conservative support.

 

But using an argument of reproductive effectiveness, the conservative support for indefinite occupations makes Darwinian sense. The space and resource-hungry model of conservative reproduction seems to be behind the curtain of this persistence of support of foreign conflicts, which curiously may be helping reproduction. Xenophobia and reproductive output are correlated variables, that is, those with the highest threat assessments from outgroups are also the most reproductive.

 

This leads to some interesting questions: does the threat of war stimulate conservative reproduction, and ultimately promote their genes within the gene pool? Do they improve reproduction during perceived threats from outgroups? The proposal that conservative reproduction is promoted by impending threats, such as terrorism, is certainly controversial. However, in a real world example of terror, war, and fertility, both the Israeli and Palestinian settlements in the West Bank are highly reproductive. While circumstantial, the xenophobia-reproductive link warrants further research.

 

In any event, Iraq is not much of an issue with conservatives, and then only in terms of "losing" the war, which seems to translate into losing reproductive advantage. Terrorism rates second with them, next to the economy. All other political cohorts rated Iraq as a much more important issue than terrorism, with liberals naturally leading the way.

 

Genetic Economics: Where the Moderates Are

 

One of the more interesting results of our survey was that the middle of the political spectrum was more concerned about the economy than either the conservatives or liberals. While all the political cohorts rated the economy as the most important issue, the conservatives were shifted towards reproductive output and terrorism (which we believe to be related), and the liberals were shifted towards health care, global warming, and ending the Iraqi war.

 

But how do economic trends translate into gene frequencies? Among males, the lower end of the income spectrum is being weeded out, and downturns in the economic cycle exacerbate this trend. The proposal that economic cycles modulate the genetic presence of low-income males is certainly arguable, but we must note that moderates were more likely to complain that financial considerations were stopping them from having children than either the conservatives or liberals. Thus, moderates may be perceiving the genetic squeeze associated with economic trends to a greater extent than any other political cohort, and voting accordingly.

 

Apocalypse Now

 

100 years from now, after the social and biological sciences have been substantially integrated, the more nostalgic scientists of the day will be looking back at this point in history with great interest. One of their main questions will be: what happened to the Caucasians in the lower latitudes? In the 20th century, they dominated the world of energy consumption, and fueled the space-hungry model of Caucasian reproduction that was especially prominent in the southern United States.

 

The state of Texas, home of two of the last three American presidents, represented the extrema of this caucasian reproductive anomaly, with its large homes on spacious lots that seemingly propagated like ice crystals into the distant horizon. Everything was big in Texas, and the total energy needed to support it was substantially larger than the more populous California. Indeed, per capita energy utilization in Texas was about twice that of California (Alaska was number one).

 

Texas was living proof that humans, if given enough energy, would space out a large population into a "comfortable" distance. However, "comfortable" distance seemed to be greater for the Caucasians. Why the Caucasians used up more space seems to be related to their peculiar climatic history.

 

When it came to body and skin type, the Caucasians followed the pre-Darwinian rules of Bergmann (1847) and Gloger (1833). Bergmann's rule states that, within a species, body size increases with colder temperatures, improving heat retention by reducing the surface to volume ratio. Gloger's rule states, also within a species, that dark pigments increase in the feathers, hair, and skin in warm and humid habitats.

 

However, what distinguished Caucasian social behavior the most was Rapoport's Rule (1975), which states that range size is a positive function of latitude. While controversial, it seems operational in many species at latitudes above 40 degrees, which indeed was near the locus of the evolution of the Caucasian population.

 

Seasonal climate variations, which are accentuated in the higher latitudes, do indeed cause wide variations in the energy requirements for survival. Caucasians were evolving in an environment of generally lower population density relative to range size. The Caucasians also required more energy to reproduce in those habitats. Average energy utilization climbs more steeply with latitude in many species (Johnson, 1998). This trend is indeed reflected in the modern-day statistics on per capita energy utilization by nation, as the highest per capita energy utilizers, by far, are Caucasian nations.

 

The Caucasian model of reproduction was born of higher energy requirements and a propensity for expanding ranges, which put them in the driver's seat when it came to interracial mingling. The Caucasians were the most geographically expansive of the races, populating every suitable habitat on every continent, and mixing up the races like never before.

 

All populations, Caucasian and non-Caucasian, exhibit trends for emigration in the face of ecological and reproductive pressures. We have previously proposed that the Caucasians are more likely to favor their upper visual field and more focused on distant extrapersonal space (see God, Dopamine, and 3-Dimensional Space), and perhaps this tendency evolved due to the selective pressure for higher energy requirements in colder climates.

 

The visual networks devoted to distant and upper space are organized around dopaminergic neurotransmission, and provide an interesting link to two closely related behaviors: religiosity and conservatism. We have previously proposed that religiosity and conservatism are geographically expansive, that is, emigration and range expansion are more likely to be undertaken by conservatives than any other cohort.

 

The Caucasians, trapped into a high-energy reproductive strategy, proceeded to burn up most of the world's oil. Per capita energy utilization was particularly high in the more recent additions to the Caucasian range lands: Canada and the United States. The oil-rich and sparsely populated Canada could handle this with relative ease, but the United States would follow a deadlier pathway to counter the energy deficit--one that would contribute to the current financial crisis.

 

This energy gap would be visible across several economic paradigms: balance of trade deficits; tax and interest rate reductions; increases in debt and bankruptcy; inflation; illegal immigration; and, the reduction of reproduction in the middle and lower classes. Further, the United States, like other industrialized countries, was experiencing rapid growth in household debt that accelerated in the middle 1980s, coincident to the Reagan presidency, and in 2001, coincident with the Bush presidency. The financial problems associated with these two presidencies is no coincidence.

 

But the problems with Caucasian reproduction were more than just financial. Caucasians, especially religious-conservatives, were the easiest to displace by other racial and religious groups. This displacement was seen in the expanding suburban populations, which were primarily reproductive Caucasians. This displacement facilitated not only the purity of Caucasian genetics, it stimulated Caucasian fertility rates. But it also required more energy.

 

There is an interesting tendency in population biology pertaining to two closely related species, occupying the same territory, and competing for similar resources: the species that is more energy-efficient in reproduction displaces the species that is not. Extrapolating this tendency to human racial groups is certainly speculative, but indeed seems to be the case with the Caucasians. While Asian and Hispanic immigrants have achieved strong and expanding footholds in Caucasian countries, the Caucasians have greater difficulty in sustaining reproduction in Asian and Hispanic countries.

 

America was not the first region to host a collision between Asian and Caucasian genetics and associated reproductive models. As previously discussed, the collision in India resulted in an interesting amalgam of male and female genetics. The upper classes favored Caucasian male genetics, while Asian female genetics were favored in all classes, with the Caucasian influence increasing with caste level.

 

How much of the recent economic disaster can be attributed to the high-energy model of Caucasian reproduction? And how are these economic trends impacting genetic trends? Perhaps the Indian precedent, 8000 years ago, gives us a window into what is currently happening in the southern United States. The principal outlet for Caucasian genes, when confronted with competing low-energy reproductive strategies, is emigration, genocide, subduction into the surrounding gene pool, or death. Will this genetic apocalypse follow the Indian model of increasing Caucasian gene frequencies in the upper castes, especially along the male lineage? Probably, but you never know how an apocalypse is going to end.

 

Charles Brack

 

October, 2008

 

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