09-11-2001: Ethnic and Religious Attitudes Five Years After
American Conservatives Versus Islam
Conservatives have no peer among the various political affiliations when it comes to organizing for intergroup competition, and it follows that military organizations are typically more conservative than the general population.
Conservatives readily organize into hierarchical organizational structures, something that Liberals do not do very well. (See How Conservatives and Liberals Organize Into Social Groups). This ability typically positions the Conservatives of most societies to manage both warfare and resource competition with out-groups.
Conservatives are also more effective at synchronizing their beliefs than any of the other political cohorts, particularly when faced with conflict and competition from out-groups. Since 9-11, the American Conservatives have shifted heavily against Islam, while the attitudes of the American Liberals have changed little. The Conservative shift against Islam has a similar pattern to the post-World War II shift against communism.
In our Ethnic and Religious Attitudes survey, we asked our 1,997 respondents to pick their least favorite race. We see the results for the Americans selecting Middle Easterners in the graph below.
Americans Reporting Middle Easterners as Their Least Favorite Race by Political-Gender Cohort (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)Overall, 13.3% of our American respondents selected Middle Easterners as their least favorite race, and this varied widely by political-gender cohort. Blacks were second among the Americans, selected by 8.6% of our respondents, followed by Hispanics, at 3.5%.
Among our females, Middle Easterners were selected as least favorite by only 1.9% of the Very Liberals, who incidentally considered Hispanics and Whites to be worse. 7.7% of the regular Liberal females selected Middle Easterners as their least favorite. Moderate females jumped sharply, to 17.7%. The Conservative females were higher at 25%, and the Very Conservative females dipped slightly, to 22.2%.
On the male side, only 1.5% of the Very Liberals selected Middle Easterners as their least favorite (they selected both Blacks and Whites to be worse). 4.3% of Liberal males selected Middle Easterners (6.4% selected Blacks). The Moderate males were next, at 12.1%, and the Conservative males leap to 25%. The Very Conservative males jump slightly to 25.8% (19.4% selected Blacks).
We must note that, with the exception of the Very Conservative males, most people indicated they did not have a "least favorite race".
However, "least favorite religious orientation" was a different matter. On average, people are much more likely to express that they have a "least favorite religious orientation" than a "least favorite race". In the graph below, we see those Americans responding that Islam is their "least favorite religious orientation".
Americans Reporting Islam as Their Least Favorite Religious Orientation by Political-Gender Cohort (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)As can be seen, the American Conservatives were not shy in expressing their dislike for Islam, and by a wide margin. In contrast, American Liberals were much more likely to select one of the varieties of Christianity as their "least favorite religious orientation" than they were Islam, also by a wide margin.
Among females, the Very Liberals, at 1.9%, hardly registered any dislike for Islam (they picked one of the varieties of Christianity at 49.1%). 9.9% of the Liberal females selected Islam (they selected one of the Christian sects at a rate of 33%). The Moderate females selected Islam first, at 22.6% (Mormonism was their next least favorite, at 9.7%).
The Conservative females also selected Islam first, at 52.9% (Atheism was their next least favorite, at 19.1%). The Very Conservative females dipped to 38.9% (Atheism was second, at 22.2%).
The males generally followed the same trends as the females. The Very Liberal males picked Islam at a rate of 6.7% (they picked one of the varieties of Christianity at a rate of 52.2%). The Liberal males picked Islam at at rate of 8% (they picked one of the varieties of Christianity at 34.8%). The Moderate males selected Islam at 23.3% (they selected Atheists second, at 13.1%).
Just like the Conservative females, the Conservative males exhibit a similar elevation in their dislike for Islam. The regular Conservative males selected Islam at the rate of 48%, followed by Atheists, at 26.2%. 52.4% of the Very Conservative males selected Islam as their least favorite (they selected Atheists second, at 21%).
Attitudes by Religious Orientation
Attitudes by religious orientation had some interesting patterns, as is depicted in the graph below, which displays the percentage of those selecting Islam as their least favorite religion. The graph is of all of our survey respondents, not just Americans.
Percent Selecting Islam as Their Least Favorite Religion by Religious OrientationThe Jewish males had the highest percentage of identifying Islam as their "least favorite religious orientation", followed closely by Christian and Catholic males. Atheists, Mormons, the Spiritual, and the Buddhist males relatively low rates.
Except for Mormons, the females had lower rates than males, although our sample size for the Mormon females was very low, and not statistically significant. In our survey, Jewish, Christian and Catholic females expressed the greatest dislike for Islam. (We left off Hindus due to insufficient sample size, although the small sample we obtained indicated Islam as their least favorite religion by a wide margin).
Five Years After: The American Conservatives Have Replaced Communism with IslamDiscussion
A recent USA Today/Gallup Poll of 1,007 Americans found that 39% of all respondents felt some form of prejudice against Muslims. The numbers of assaults and discrimination complaints by Muslims skyrocketed right after 9-11, dropped in 2002, and subsequently escalated since the start of the Iraqi war.
A number of post 9-11 studies have found strong correlations between American patriotism and prejudice against Muslims, so it should be no surprise that our results vary by political cohort.
The rapid increase in anti-Muslim sentiment among the American Conservatives is a case study in the Conservative propensity to organize for intergroup competition, and the greater propensity for synchonizing their attitudes and coordinating their behavior to facilitate it. Islam has replaced communism in the eyes of most Conservatives.
In a species with a long history of intergroup conflict, the Conservatives position a social group for defense like no other political cohort. However, they also position social groups for offensive warfare, and the integration of Conservative and Liberal attitudes create an interesting dynamic of checks and balances for intergroup conflict.
Liberals may actually organize better for intragroup conflict against the Conservatives than for conflict with out-groups.
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Sexual and Political Preference
The high rates of non-heterosexuality across many species is the source of many headaches for evolutionary biologists. While "homosexual" genes have been isolated in insects with simple nervous systems, the isolation of specific "gay" genes for the complex human nervous system remains highly controversial.
The First Female President? Angelina Jolie, an admitted bisexual, talks of running for SenatorThis is probably because heterosexuality, like non- heterosexuality, is an integration of many genetic traits, along with other biological and environmental influences, that combine to form an integrated reproductive profile, or phenotype. This integrated reproductive profile includes not only sexual desire and fertility, but also child-rearing skills, social skills, survival skills, and the tendency to improve the reproductive yield in offspring.
There is some controversial evidence that both male and female heterosexual behavior may both be influenced by the X chromosome, and some theories have proposed that female bisexual/homosexual tendencies may improve the probability of heterosexuality in male offspring. Females have two X chromosomes, and coincidentally were more likely to describe themselves as bisexual, at least in our survey. There is also some controversial evidence that inconsistent male heterosexuality increases the fertility rates in female offspring.
In other words, inconsistent heterosexual behavior in a parent may improve reproductive yields in the opposite sex child, while possibly diminishing reproductive yields in the same sex child. This may even be a reproductive advantage if paired with a tendency to produce an opposite sex child.
But the intersection of genetic, biological, and environmental influences that create the spectrum of successful reproductive phenotypes also result in non-heterosexual tendencies at a high rate. The high rates of inconsistent heterosexuality (estimates vary from 10% to 50% across many species), imply that sexuality has a large number of disparate influences.
In humans, these influences usually combine to create a robust heterosexual phenotype, but this population robustness seems to be optimized when a substantial segment of that population is not consistently heterosexual. In other words, successful reproductive phenotypes, which produce the greatest volume of viable offspring over thousands of generations, may actually be based on inconsistent heterosexual tendencies in the population in general. This would explain why inconsistent heterosexuality persists at high rates in species that are millions of years old.
But what does all this have to do with Conservatives and Liberals? As we have stated before, Conservatism and Liberalism are as much reproductive strategies as they are political ideologies. Nowhere is this more apparent than with sexual preference. The differences between the reported rates of heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, asexuality, and ambiguous sexuality among our political cohorts are substantial, and pose some interesting questions as to how much sexual preference is genetic, how much is biological, how much is environmental, and how much are people inhibiting their inconsistent heterosexuality via social cues?
Specifically, are the religious Conservatives using social cues to suppress inconsistent heterosexuality more so than the Liberals, Moderates, and Libertarians--or are they really more innately heterosexual?
Rates of Heterosexuality
Those Reporting They are Heterosexual by Political-Gender Cohort (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)Heterosexuality is not only correlated with political preference, it is a positive function as one goes from left to right on the political scale. On the male side, the Very Conservatives reported the highest rate of heterosexuality (97.1%), immediately followed by the regular Conservatives (96.4%). The Moderates drop slightly to 92.2%. Heterosexuality drops off substantially for the Liberal males, at 82.7%, and reaches its low point with the Very Liberal males, at 76.5%. (Not shown are the Libertarian males, which had a low rate of heterosexuality, at 82.5%).
On the female side, the Conservatives achieve the highest rate of heterosexuality, at 97.2%. The Very Conservative females are close behind, at 95%, although this drop off from the regular Conservatives is not statistically significant. The Moderate females drop off significantly at 80%. The Liberal females are close to the Moderates, at 81.1%, and the Very Liberal females recorded the lowest rate of heterosexuality, at 71.7%. (Not shown are the Libertarian females, which had a low rate of heterosexuality, at 74.4%).
Rates of Homosexuality
Those Reporting They are Homosexual by Political-Gender Cohort (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)Homosexuality is highly correlated with political preference, and is elevated on the Liberal side of the political scale. In females, the Very Liberals have the highest rate, at 9.7%. The female Liberals drop down to 5.7%. The female Moderates drop to 3.1%, and the Conservative females reported 1.4%. The Very Conservative females reported 0.0%, but also had a low sample size.
Among the males, the Very Liberals again reported the highest rate of homosexuality at 7.5%. The Liberal males were close behind at 6.6%. The male Moderates dropped to 2%, and the regular Conservative males dropped to 1.1%. There was a slight, but not statistically significant increase in the Very Conservative males, at 1.5%.
Rates of Bisexuality
Those Reporting They are Bisexual by Political-Gender Cohort (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)Reported bisexuality is again elevated on the left side of the political scale. The Very Liberal females reported the highest rate, at 14.2%. The Liberal females dropped off substantially, at 8.5%. Breaking the trend, the Moderate females were higher than the Liberals, at 10.8%. The Conservative females were at 1.4%, and the Very Conservative females had a non-statistically significant increase to 5.0%. (Not shown are the Libertarian females that reported the highest rate of bisexuality, at 20.5%).
On the male side, the Very Liberals were again the highest, at 12.3%. The Liberal males were next, at 7.7%, and the Moderate males drop off significantly at 2.7%. The Conservative males were slightly less, at 1.8%, and the Very Conservatives were slightly lower at 1.5%. (Not shown are the Libertarian males, that reported 11.8%).
Note that both males and females were more likely to report bisexuality than homosexuality.
Rates of Asexuality and Ambiguous Sexuality
Those Reporting They are Asexual or "Not Sure" of Their Sexuality by Political-Gender Cohort (Light Blue=Not sure, Green=Asexual, Purple=No Answer) (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)The rates of reported asexuality are low, and are highest among the Very Liberal males (2.7%) and the regular Liberal females (2.8%). We had a small percentage report that were not sure of their sexuality, which was led by the Very Liberal females (3.5%), and the regular Liberal males (1.8%). We also had several no answers, mainly among the Moderates, which we interpret to be non-heterosexual.
Discussion
What are we to make of the disparity in the reported rates of Conservative and Liberal non-heterosexuality? Are religious Conservatives more innately heterosexual, or are they more effectively utilizing social cues to inhibit inconsistent heterosexual tendencies?
All research pertaining to sexual orientation is highly controversial, as is the clinical evidence of the utilization of social cues to inhibit homosexual tendencies. Adams, Wright, and Lohr have provided some evidence that excessively homophobic males are actually more aroused by gay pornography than non-homophobic heterosexual males. However, this hotly debated study has alternative interpretations, so the relationship between homophobia and homosexual tendencies is equivocal.
But as we have suggested in Conservatives, Liberals, and Behavioral Inhibition: A Tale of Two Moralities, Conservatives utilize social cues more than Liberals to manage their behavior within social groups. This might explain why the religious Conservatives are more likely to view homosexuality as a choice, whereas the secular Liberals are more likely to promote genetic or biological explanations with little conscious control over sexual preference.
In other words, the religious Conservatives are more influenced by the social management of their sexuality, and more reliant on establishing immoral valences to non-heterosexual behavior. This would explain their strong reaction towards gay marriage, which has had the secular Liberals somewhat bewildered.
Ironically, while this strong religious Conservative reaction against inconsistent heterosexuality would seem to improve the short-term yield of total offspring produced by a given population, it would also be more likely to retain any genetic influences towards non-heterosexuality within that same population. This introduces the question of which political cohort is contributing more to the retention of non-heterosexual genetic influences, and further, what is the relationship between hemisphericity and sexual preference?
To be continued.
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Brack and Zhang, September 2006
Email: Brack@neuropolitics.org
Zhang@neuropolitics.org
The Asymmetric Demand for Oil: Conservatives, Liberals, and Automobiles
One of our wildest theories, even by our standards, was that Conservatives move things around more than Liberals. We proposed that Conservatives were more likely to have occupations in transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, construction, mining and resource extraction, and any industry that involved a higher degree of displacing objects.
Our rationale for this admittedly silly notion was based on the greater influence of the dopaminergic activation system in Conservative behavior, and the Conservative's corresponding greater tendency for pursuing physical rewards. The displacement of objects was directly related to this tendency. This relieved us of the problem of defining reward seeking and further provided for a number of more measurable correlated variables. We believe that we have gathered some evidence of two of these correlated variables, which are automobile ownership and driving.
Previously, we had noted some pretty interesting discrepancies about the general spatial requirements of Conservatives versus Liberals. Conservatives require more living space than Liberals (see our October 2005 edition), and generally dislike highly urbanized environments. They also like more space within the home, and maintain higher square footages per person, despite having more people in their households than do the Liberals (see our November 2005 edition).
Based on the 1,914 respondents (we removed the under-18 age group) to our most recent survey, we believe that Conservatives are more likely not only to drive automobiles, but also prefer larger vehicles than Liberals, even when controlling for income.
In the graph below, we see the responses of Conservatives and Liberals, by gender, for the various automotive modes of transportation. For this graph, we combined the Very Liberals in with the Liberals, and the Very Conservatives with the Conservatives.
What Kind Of Car Do You Drive? (C=Conservative, L=Liberal)The Liberal males and females had substantially higher rates of not-driving, 23.9% and 13.6% respectively, than did their Conservative counterparts, at 6.2% and 4.4%. It is interesting to note that both the Conservative and Liberal males had higher rates of not-driving than their respective female counterparts, something that has us puzzled. However, given the ambiguous way we formulated the question, we are not sure if this response meant that the respondent didn't own a car, or didn't drive at all.
This may indicate that Conservatives, on average, cover more territory than Liberals. This is at best speculation, but if true, would be a remarkable result, and consistent with territorial range variances found in other species. We must also note that the higher income Liberals ($100K or more total household income) are less likely to drive than the lower income Conservatives (less than $100K).
The Conservatives, in general, drive larger automobiles than Liberals. Liberals are more likely to drive compact cars than Conservatives, even if they have higher incomes. Conservatives are more likely to drive SUVs, full-size trucks, and vans. SUVs are a particular favorite among the higher income Conservatives, which certainly fits in with their tendency towards larger family sizes and greater spatial requirements.
Interestingly, SUVs became much more popular with both Conservatives and Liberals as total family incomes exceeded $100K--especially the Conservative females. Another interesting trend was that Conservative males and female Liberals had strong preferences for sports cars as their incomes grew. The Liberals had higher rates of selecting "Other", which we are not sure how to interpret, but may indicate some form of hybrid vehicle, motorcycle, or scooter.
Discussion
Beyond the functional aspects of transportation, automobile ownership obviously has many social overtones, such as dominance, sexual selection, and social concern. The automobile is the nexus of many fundamental variations in Conservative and Liberal behavior. The Conservative's need for more space, which is a fundamental reproductive behavior, seems to extend from the community and home and into the interiors of the automobile. The Liberal tendency to leave smaller footprints on their environments is evident by their lower rates of driving and their preferences for smaller, more fuel-efficient cars.
The Conservatives, which we found to be elevated relative to the Liberals in at least one common primate dominance behavior, eye-contact, may be more prone towards vehicular dominance displays. Other studies have noted a strong relationship between the driving of "prestige" automobiles with males that are the heads of their respective families. The relationship between automobiles and reproductive opportunities is certainly positive, and sexual selection is driving a large segment of the automobile market.
Based on our results, we can certainly infer that Conservatives are using more oil per capita than the Liberals, so it is not surprising that the Conservatives also seem to be producing more oil. The American oil industry is one of the most conservative, based on the political party affiliations and contribution patterns of oil-industry CEOs.
While we still have not provided any direct evidence of one of our wildest theories, that Conservatives move things around more than Liberals, we have provided indirect evidence that they may be moving themselves around more. The possibility that these two political cohorts actually have different propensities for movement around their respective habitats is one of their more deeply hidden behavioral variances. _________________________________________
The Population Density of Hell
The theological content of modern religions are typically amalgams of older religions, and for a very good reason: religions don't do very well if they are integrated with large majorities of non-believers. This is because the religious are more likely to use social cues in the maintenance of their belief systems. Religious people are more likely to believe in something for the simple fact that other people believe it, and this hints at a stronger influence of the left temporal cortex in their cognitive styles and corresponding social behavior.
This hinders the development of new religions, unless they are isolated or borrow from the theological potpourri of the more popular indigenous religions. Christianity is an excellent example of this process, as its chief architect, Saint Paul, adapted many religious ideas from his home town of Tarsus, which was a center for Mithraic worship.
Mithras was an ancient Persian sun god that underwent a number of permutations as it was repeatedly absorbed into a variety of eastern Mediterranean cults before ending up as Sol Invictus in the Roman Cult of the Invincible Sun. Paul's fortuitous Christian adaptation of many Mithraic religious traditions, such as sacrifice, resurrection, virgin birth, baptism, communion, holy water, Sunday as a holy day, and December 25 as the birth of the deity, would pay huge dividends later as the Romans were concurrently adapting similar Mithraic practices into their Sun Cult.
The spread of the Cult of the Invincible Sun had the fourth century Roman empire well positioned for the spread of Christianity. But Paul's Mithraic interpretation of the significance of Jesus Christ would anoint him to the status of a deity, which would have been shocking news to Jesus himself. Paul incorporated another controversial idea that would combine a sacrificing and resurrected Jesus, the acceptance of Jesus as Savior for entrance into heaven, and a Gnostically-derived eternal damnation for all the people that don't believe it.
This view, as we shall see, still has a lot of appeal among the Christian faithful. This view played very well in the Roman war-refugee camps that Paul recruited from, and the further anticipation of the second coming of Christ to punish the seemingly invincible Romans was icing on the early Christian cake.
The development of this exclusionary model of heavenly acceptance and eternal damnation for the unbelievers was certainly understandable given the high levels of intergroup conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, and was initially directed against the Roman occupiers. But its persistence among the modern-day religious Christians poses some interesting questions. While the prevailing religions of Paul's day were usually applying moral rules for entrance into a divine afterlife, Paul sought to remove personal moral conduct and replace it with the acceptance of Jesus as savior.
But Paul's reduced entrance requirements and exclusionary approach to heaven were not unanimous among the contributors and interpreters of the New Testament, and is not taken too seriously by many Christian sects, including Catholicism and Mormonism.
But exclusion into heaven is a very hot topic with our Conservatives, as we see in our results from our Ethnic and Religious Attitudes Survey. We asked the 1,997 respondents: If you lead a moralistic lifestyle, but do not believe in God, will you go to heaven? Below we see the percentages of those responding no.
If you are moral but don't believe in God, will you go to heaven? Percent responding with no. (VL=Very Liberal, L=Liberal, M=Moderate, LB=Libertarian, C=Conservative, VC=Very Conservative)As expected, the Conservatives were much more likely to believe that morality alone will not get you into heaven. This is coming primarily from the Christian Conservatives, who were eight times more likely to answer no than yes. In contrast, Conservative Catholics and Mormons were more likely to believe that moral behavior without belief in a deity will get you into heaven. Our Muslim sample was too small to make any definitive conclusions, but the trickle of responses looked very much like Conservative Christians, as they also were much more likely to answer no than yes.
One interesting note is that total family income had a substantial impact on the results. Those with family incomes under $100K were more likely to answer no than those with incomes more than $100K. We also added the Libertarian responses, more to illustrate one of the substantial differences the Libertarians have with the Conservatives--religious orientation. The Libertarians maintain religious profiles that are similar to Liberals, while their beliefs in social controls on economic behavior more closely resemble the Conservatives. (We'll be discussing the interesting political-psychological nuances of the Libertarians in a future edition).
